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Chapter I: Introduction - Conceptions of Regionalism
1.1 Introduction
The period from W orld W ar II until the m id-seventies saw various 
attempts made to com prehend the process by which states jo in  together. It 
appeared that the p ro life ra tion  of reg ional o rganizations constitu ted  the 
arrival of a sign ifican t new actor w hich would challenge the R ealist 
state-centric view  of In ternational R elations. G eneral theories of regional 
cooperation such as functionalism  and neo-functionalism  were produced, yet 
these did not prove to be adequate in their attem pts to describe what was 
taking place. The new theories along with more traditional R ealism  were 
subjected to various refinem ents, which were developed chiefly  to analyze 
the situation in W estern Europe since W orld W ar II.
Since the m id-seventies, though, as T aylor1 has noted, scholars have 
been w ary w hen it com es to p roducing  general w orks on reg ional 
cooperation. W hilst the num ber of regional organizations has continued to 
increase scholars have tended to retreat into area studies. This sub-thesis 
aims in a modest way to help to remedy this situation by considering aspects 
of the A ssociation of Southeast Asian N ations(A SEA N ), one of the more 
successful contem porary cases of regional cooperation. The present writer 
will seek to show that the insights gained by studying successful regionalism 
in W estern Europe do  have application to understanding the progress of 
regional cooperation in Southeast Asia. In other words, perhaps the theorists 
gave up the com parative task prem aturely !
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In this introductory  chapter, the task w ill be approached in the 
following manner: (i) the concept of regionalism  will be briefly defined; (ii) a 
description will be offered of the main general theories historically used to 
describe European regionalism ; (iii) the inadequacies of these theories will be 
dem onstrated; and (iv) the foregoing analysis w ill be used to produce a 
fram ework which will help to explain why European regional cooperation has 
succeeded. Later chapters w ill consider regionalism  in Southeast Asia and 
will assess the applicability of the above fram ework to the developm ent of 
the ASEAN.
(i)
1.2 Regionalism
The most basic concept involved in this study is that of a region. In 
the field of International Relations, a num ber of attempts have been made to 
define regions. The m ore scientific  approach has attem pted to analyze 
various rates of transactions between states. It has worked on the prem ise 
that states which have g rea ter rates o f in te rdependen t behaviour and 
com patibility of conduct - as gauged by criteria diverse as postal rates and 
UN voting  p a tte rn s 2 - particu larly  when com pared w ith their rates of 
transactions with other states, can be successfully grouped as a region. The 
greater the verisim ilitude existing between different sets of data the more 
clearly defined is the particular region.
The m ore classical approach to defining a region consists in the
historical tendency of the peoples in certain nations to consider themselves 
part of a reg ion , usually  based on geographical contiguity  and ethnic,
linguistic, cultural and/or religious ties. The definition is further consolidated 
by the cartographers and the recognition of a particular region by outsiders. 
By a happy coincidence the 'white coat' approach and the more descriptive 
approach arrive at approxim ately  the sam e destina tions with the latter 
having used som ew hat few er com puter p rin tou ts ! There is general
agreement on the existence and extent of regions such as Europe, the Middle 
East and Southeast A sia .3 The questionable status of borderline states such as 
Turkey and pariah nations such as Burm a is tangentia l to the present
p u rp o se .
Regionalism  will be taken as the w illingness of particular states 
both to identify and to collaborate with other states in the same region to 
achieve common goals. The substance of such joint efforts may fall into the 
dom ains of econom ics, politics or security m atters4 Regional cooperation,
particularly  as it in tensifies and involves the subordination of national to 
regional interests, may lead to integration .5
(ü)
1.3 Functionalism , Neo-functionalism and Neo-realism  
E uropean regional cooperation  is generally  hailed as the most 
successful case and therefore it is not surprising that much of the theorizing 
has focussed on events in W estern Europe. Even before the end of World War 
II, M itrany was developing ideas about how regional cooperation could help 
to prevent W orld W ar III.6 By the late fifties, W estern Europe having seen 
the conclusion of the Treaty of Rome, w a s  evidencing a measure of closer 
regional cooperation. The key question for scholars to face was, ’W hat was it 
that gave regionalism  momentum ?' Related to this is the question of why 
some cases of regionalism  such as W estern Europe have achieved a measure 
of success whilst others in the Caribbean and Africa appeared to stagnate or 
w h ith e r .
The in ternal dynam ic of in tensify ing  reg ional cooperation was 
believed to be 'the spillover effect'.7 It is im portant to differentiate between 
the functionalist and the neo-functionalist definitions of this concept. In the 
former cooperation begins in less contentious areas and is driven on by felt 
need. Cooperation takes place as benefits are perceived and the domain of 
each act of cooperation reflects the function and therefore can vary from 
case to case.8 Functionalism  does not lead to a centralized super-state. Rather, 
the state becom es less relevan t as many im portant tasks are carried out 
instead by functionalist adm inistrations whose territorial domain can vary.
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N eo-func tiona lism , however, c la im s that low level forms of
cooperation between nations in non-controversial fields will n e c e s s i t a t e  
further nodes of cooperation both to facilitate the smooth functioning of the 
simpler forms and as a result of the perception that the benefits accruing 
from cooperation in one field may be translated into others:9
In its earliest form this process was thought to have 
a kind of deterministic quality which led to its being 
called 'the necessary logic' of neo-functionalism, or 
the 'functional imperative'.
The integration process would move forward i n c r e m e n t a l l y . For example, 
the advent of a unified  m arket would generate  supporting political 
cooperation . Labour laws would need to be standardized  to prevent 
employers taking advantage of lax labour laws in one part of the region to 
the detriment of businesses located in other member states where higher 
standards are enforced .10
More generally, there was a belief that economic changes would
stimulate the matching political changes.11 And further, related to this view
%
of integration there has developed the concept of 'take-off'. Once a certain 
level of in tegration  has taken place it will stim ulate  further, deeper 
integration and so on until political and economic union are realized.
It should be stressed  at this po in t that advocates of the 
neo-functionalist spillover dynamic such as Haas did not see it as the sole 
determ inant of reg iona lis t  behaviour. His 1958 artic le  discusses other 
significant factors contributing to a proper understanding of the success or
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otherw ise of reg ional coopera tion .12 Instead, the focus here will be on the 
e m p h a s i s  that was attached to the m a n n e r  in which increased economic 
cooperation  was believed  to p rec ip ita te  increased  po litica l cooperation. 
Econom ic cooperation was supposed to lead sm oothly and necessarily to 
closer and closer ties between states and eventual political union.13
N ot all theoriz ing , how ever, has proceeded down the path of 
fu n c tio n a lism  and n eo -fu n c tio n a lism . Som e scho lars have sought to 
em phasize that the state has in fact m aintained primacy as the key political 
actor and that at the crucial point, the leaders of states will continue to 
m aintain their own sovereignty. Iin practice, though, other actors do play a 
supporting role, the key actors are nation-states. The R ealist concept of 
power was widened to include econom ic concerns as well as political and 
security ones.14 This view in some places has been termed Neo-realism. It is 
held that 'R eg ionalism ' can give rise  to larger sta tes, but the basic 
building-block is still of the same type.
(iii)
1.7 Limitations o f  General Theories
By the m id-seventies the m ovem ent to codify a general theory of 
regionalism  had run out o f steam. Its end was signalled by H aas’ essay 
proclaim ing ’the obsolescence of regional integration theory’ together with a 
work by Russett which had the effect of making further study in the area
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u n a t t r a c t iv e .15 F unctionalism , although a useful and in teresting  starting 
point had been ruled out as a satisfactory overall explanation.16
H aas rea lized  the n e o -fu n c tio n a lis t approach  had sign ifican t 
problem s. De G aulle 's ac tions17 appeared to go in the direction opposite to 
that prescibed by neo-functionalism . W hilst standing for the expansion of the 
econom ic dim ension of the Common M arket he stood, with some success, 
resolutely against the extension of political integration through the ceding of 
greater pow ers to the supranational au tho rity .18 Of course, in more recent 
years the U nited K ingdom , especially  under T hatcher, has m anifested 
elements of a sim ilar approach.
In addition, Haas reached the understanding that the integrative 
process was not bound to proceed by incremental steps. He argued that such 
sm all advances w ere greatly  suscep tib le  to reverse. H aas' 1967 study 
showed that some of the most significant changes which took place in 
Europe rather appeared to require a strong coincidence of political w ill19 on  
the part of the key participants.20 W hat moved a regional grouping forward 
in a more steadfast and enduring way was 'political w ill’. In effect this idea 
means that some m om ent of perceived crisis, com m on need or common 
aspiration will be the engine to drive the relevan t decision-m akers in a 
regional grouping to take steps that will intensify cooperation. Additionally 
such resolve on the part of decision-m akers w ill be necessary to carry 
through decisions rather than to leave them as nice ideas.21
Haas then argued, that though the conventional neo-functionalist
p. 1 2
theory of regionalism  might have had significant power in explaining the 
first decade of post-W ar w estern E uropean  co o pera tion ,22 it was less 
successful in the years after this time. One needed to look at other factors 
compelling decision makers to adopt measures that would greatly alter the 
nature of cooperation among the member states, as well as the role of 
leaders, to achieve a fuller understanding.
Haas has not been the only scholar to find fault with the general 
theory. W riting in 1992, Jens Henrik Haahr noted23 that the prevailing 
neo-functionalist general theory of international relations had failed to allow 
for: the distinction between positive and negative aspects of integration; the 
d istinction between high and low politics and the im portance of the 
international environment; and the fact that regional policy coordination may 
be substituted for political integration. One also needed to allow for the role 
of political actors in affecting the process of regional cooperation.
So, in understanding regional integration it is difficult to reject
Haahr's observation based upon Nye:24
T h u s ,  th e  n e o - f u n c t i o n a l i s t  e m p h a s i s  on 
increm entalism  in econom ic and welfare oriented 
areas and on the key concepts of functional and 
’cu ltivated’ spillover (Nye, 1971, pp .200-2) as the 
im pe tu s  u n d e r ly in g  c o n tin u ed  in te g ra t io n  was 
re jec ted  as being  of l i t t le  re lev an ce  to an 
understanding of actual EC developments.
The obvious implication of this statement, is, that to obtain a grasp of
European integration, it is necessary to look more directly at events in
Europe itself. The general theory will not even hold for the case upon which
it was predom inantly  based. However, the question of why European
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regionalism  has experienced a m easure of success w hilst other attem pts at 
regional cooperation have failed rem ains to be answered.
(iv)
1.8 Europe Reconsidered: Context, Political Will and Leadership
Thus, the case of European regional integration shows that general 
theories along fu n c tio n a lis t/n eo -fu n c tio n a lis t lines do no t p rov ide  an 
adequate explanation of what has happened. It is also obvious, however, 
that a Realist description focusing on 'high politics' is also unsatisfactory. 
For example, 'low' political actors such as business corporations have played 
an im portant part in pushing the pace of econom ic reform s among the
states of W estern Europe.
An understanding of European regionalism  m ust borrow  from 
both the Realist and the neo-functionalist sides. From the form er it takes 
the fact that the consent and at tim es the advocacy of those in power
(corporately and individually) is required in order to initiate, maintain and
expand effective regional cooperation; the latter has highlighted the vital 
im portance of a meaningful regional context.
The success of W estern  E uropean reg ionalism  can, then, be 
accounted for by considering the axes of context, p o l it ica l  w ill  and
lea d ersh ip . C o n tex t  has already been considered but briefly can be viewed
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as the sum of existing ties, especially functional ones that exist between 
states in a region. It is built up over time but is not of itself sufficient to 
ensure successful regionalism .
Europe's context has been noted as highly favourable to regional 
coopera tion  and in teg ra tio n . The o rig ina l Six w ere all dem ocratic , 
industrialized countries with a long record of cultural and functional ties.25 
The cause of European integration has enjoyed substantial h istorical and 
ideological backing. Europe has known periods of unity such as the Holy 
Rom an E m pire under the reign  of C harlem agne and m ore recen tly  
m echanism s such as the nineteenth century Council of Europe. H istorically, 
religion has also played a part in providing a shared sense of European 
id e n ti ty .26
Poli t ical  will  is the resolution required on the part of those in 
pow er in order to in itia te  or in tensify  regional cooperation. It can be 
m otivated by a variety  of im peratives and circum stances, both internal 
and external to the states involved in regionalism . Among the factors likely 
to stim ulate  the exercise  of po litical w ill are security  and econom ic 
concerns.
Even the in itia l efforts to try to secure W estern  E uropean 
integration required the conscious decision of political leaders of the time. 
Further down the track , the Treaty of Rome was not m erely a legal 
sp illover that was p rec ip ita ted  by the need to regu la te  C om m unity 
econom ic cooperation. It expressed goals of greater political union. There
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was the hope of a 'United Europe'.
It is quite easy to assem ble an array of factors that during the 
lifespan  of the E uropean  Com m unity have provided leaders w ith the 
'm otivation' to agree upon moves that would increase cooperation and even 
centralize power away from their own adm inistration. Such factors relate to 
the econom ic, political and security aspects of cooperation. Econom ically, 
there was the need to rehabilitate a war-ravaged W estern Europe and more 
lately the establishm ent of an integrated m arket perm its Europe to assume 
a more com petitive position in world trade. Politically, European integration 
has offered Europe the opportunity collectively to occupy a place upon the 
world stage which was not available individually .27
European in tegration  has also offered the p rospect of greater 
security. Germany, the aggressor in two world wars was now on the same 
side. A united W estern Europe and American financial and military backing 
seemed a safer prospect in the Cold W ar than that of standing divided and 
alone. European cooperation has also fostered security within its member 
states through closing ranks and has lim ited any cross-border support to 
'in terna l' th reats such as those posed by the Basques and the Irish 
Republican Army. The EC does not provide a forum for criticism , or other 
actions that would threaten the territorial integrity of its members.
W ith such a coalition of supporting factors, it was not surprising 
that the leaders of the states that became known as 'the Six' could produce 
the political will to embark on and continue the process of cooperation.
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C onversely, Haas pointed out that Britain and the Scandinavian 
countries did not, in 1950, have a clear sense that nationalism  had failed 
th e m .28 Unlike the citizens of states such as (W est) Germany, Italy and 
France they lacked the impetus to look beyond their borders to a regional 
alternative. It is no coincidence, therefore, that the UK and Denmark have
proved  to be tw o of the m ost re lu c tan t supporte rs  of E uropean  
in te g ra tio n .29 Their relative success in maintaining faith in the nation-state 
has diminished their political will to merge into W estern Europe as whole.
L e a d e r s h i p  is taken as the part played by key individuals, elites 
or particu lar nations in sustaining (and at times resisting !) the regional 
cooperation process. In the case of the European Communities, the student 
gains a good understanding of the progress of regionalism  by considering 
the dimension of leadership as well as that of context and political will.
European unity has enjoyed support from significant individuals 
such as Monet and Churchill. On the other hand it has been noted30 that 
President De Gaulle (and more recently Prime M inister Thatcher) have at 
times acted to retard the pace of integration.
On a bureaucratic level, the EC 'Eurocrats’ centred in Brussels and 
with delegations located around the globe also provide a form of leadership. 
This has been consisten tly  in the direction of greater in tegration. The 
perception that what has become known as the European ’train’ is bound 
for the final destination of full integration, probably expressed in a United 
States of Europe, has provided a sort of suprem e adm inistrative guiding
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principle for the efforts of these civil servants.3 1
It is difficult to argue that any one European state has exercised a 
decisive leadership position over time, during the EC’s history. This may be 
attributed to the fact that no one member nation is of such a size as to 
dw arf the others. Instead, it is more accurate to cite the m anner in which 
particu lar states have been able to colour Com munity policy on various 
issues. The baleful role of the French in regard to furthering agricultural 
reforms would be a case in point.
The above analysis, then, fits W estern Europe. It is next 
proposed to use it to consider developments in Southeast Asian regionalism. 
This application will not be in the sense of seeking to create the inchoate 
form  of som e new, grand general theory of reg ionalism . Rather, the 
em phasis will be placed upon considering the fruitfu lness of employing 
context, political w ill and leadership as reference axes in understanding 
(successful) regional cooperation.
This approach w ill raise further questions about the com parative 
strengths in these three areas. Can a deficit in context be countered by a 
greater m easure of po litica l w ill and/or leadership  ? Can leadership 
succeed in overcoming history to generate a stronger context ? In the next 
two chapters the groundw ork necessary to answer these questions will be 
u n d e r ta k e n .
p. 18
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Chapter II: The Genesis of the ASEAN
2.1 In troduction
This chapter will look at the birth of the ASEAN. The approach 
taken will be to m easure the genesis of regional cooperation in Southeast 
Asia against the findings of chapter one. The first of two sections will deal 
w ith the background to the ASEAN, including the question of why its 
predecessors were relatively unsuccessful. D iscussion will then move on to 
the factors that precipitated the form ation of ASEAN and the three axes of 
context, political will and leadership.
2.2 Predecessors o f the ASEAN
At the outset, it is worth noting that in the fifties Southeast Asian 
regional cooperation was lim ited by the fact that three later members of the 
ASEAN - Brunei, M alaysia and Singapore - were not yet independent while 
Burma had to be careful to do nothing to offend C hina.1 The Indochinese 
sta tes w ere a fflic ted  by the a fte r-e ffec ts  of a b loody struggle  for 
independence  as well as in ternal d iv isions. Thus, the possib le  active 
participants in regional cooperation were confined in scope to Indonesia, The 
Philippines and Thailand.
In addition, at this time, former colonies tended to preserve close 
trading links with the form er colonizers. The lack of industrialization and the 
reliance upon sim ilar com m odity bases also m eant that there was little
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economic interaction among states in regions such as Southeast Asia. Trading 
ties tended to be vertical with Europe or the USA rather than horizontal with 
neighbours. So, in the fifties there was no talk of the establishm ent of a 
Southeast Asian economic community along the lines of the cooperation that 
was occurring in Europe.
The early forays of states from Southeast Asia into cooperation with 
other nations essentially were of two types: politically-oriented, in the sense 
of being aimed at visionary political goals, and security or alliance based. 
P artic ipation  from  w ithin Southeast A sia in such groupings was lim ited 
compared with that from outside.
The types of politically-orientated cooperation pursued at this time 
were closely linked to the international clim ate of the period as well as the 
outlook of the leaders involved. In the early 1950s, it was the concern of 
those states such as Indonesia, that had just won independence, to seek to 
assert their newly acquired status on the international stage.
With the increasingly strong position of a charismatic leader such as 
Soekarno, it was not surprising to find Indonesia involved in early regional 
ventures with India and also seeking to play a prom inent role in such 
groupings as the A fro-A sian Conferences and the N on-A ligned Movement. 
The aims of such forums were chiefly political. They were an attem pt to 
cu ltivate  Third W orld so lidarity  and to dem onstrate  that there was an 
alternative to the two sides of the Cold War. Such efforts clim axed in the 
Bandung Conference of 1955 but idealistic  hopes were shattered by the
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Sino-Indian W ar of 1962.
In effect, the early attem pts at political cooperation were certainly 
visionary but their failure was inevitable due to the absence of a supporting 
context. There were few if any logical or functional links among the members 
that would be necessary to sustain m eaningful regional cooperation. Indeed, 
the vast geographic spread of mem bers involved in the N on-A ligned and 
A fro-A sian m ovem ents meant that many of them had little in common that 
would support regionalism .
SEATO (South East Asia Treaty O rganization) was an attem pt to 
foster regional m ilitary cooperation on a small scale, yet ironically, only a 
m inority of its m embers could claim  to be Southeast Asian. SEATO never 
gained broad support within the region. In particular, Indonesia opposed 
SEATO as being a continuing manifestation of the OLDEFOS (Old Established 
Forces) and contrary to its own independent and resilient stance. In addition 
to Great B ritain’s ties with M alaysia and Singapore, the existence of SEATO 
helped to divide Southeast Asia into two competing blocs.
The early sixties witnessed two other attem pts at Southeast Asian 
regionalism , the A ssociation of Southeast Asia (ASA) and MAPHILINDO 
(M alaysia, The Philippines and Indonesia). In contrast to SEATO, the ASA and 
M APHILINDO were both locally initiated. The ASA joined M alaysia, The 
Philippines and T hailand in a grouping that was designed to enhance 
cooperation across a variety of areas. In particular, it started to establish 
ad m in istra tiv e  m achinery  as w ell as fo rm u la ting  p lans for p ractical,
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functional cooperation in the field of economics.
M APHILINDO was a short-lived proposal that included Indonesia, 
M alaysia and The Philippines. It was intended to dem onstrate solidarity 
among the M alay peoples of these three nations. Also, it was supposed to 
am elio ra te  the problem s that ex isted  at the tim e betw een the three 
partic ipan ts, particu larly  over the status of N orth Borneo and M alaysia's 
in d e p e n d e n c e .
M APHILINDO's early decease, as well as the ASA’s immobilization 
owing to the effect of C onfrontation, m eant that neither of the initiatives 
would become a lasting m echanism  for Southeast Asian regional integration. 
The ASA did, however, provide the organizational base upon which the 
ASEAN would build, and thus needs to be seen as the first step in the
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m ainstream  of regionalism  in Southeast Asia. Unlike the type of intangible, 
visionary mode witnessed in such form ulations as the Afro-Asian movement 
and M APHILINDO, the ASA did seem to be moving towards more concrete 
forms of cooperation.
2.3 Reasons for the Failure of the ASEAN's Predecessors 
Why, then, did the ASEAN's forerunners, and particularly the ASA, 
not meet with success ? Answering this question should provide clues as to 
why the ASEAN was successfully formed and as to why it has continued. 
There were two primary reasons - disputes among members and the absence 
of Indonesia - for the failure of the ASEAN’s predecessors, as well as a
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num ber of other secondary contributing factors, such as small memberships, 
p o litica l u n d erd ev elo p m en t/in ex p erien ce , vary ing  p o litica l ou tlooks and 
hence the lack of a com m only perceived  th reat. T hese prim ary and 
secondary factors can be analyzed under the headings of context, po litica l  
w ill  and l e a d e r s h ip .
2.4 Context and the Failure o f  the ASEAN's Predecessors
Quite clearly, very little functional cooperation existed between the 
states that would later form the ASEAN and this absence would certainly be 
an im pedim ent to successful regionalism . Southeast Asia would have to wait 
a very long time indeed if incremental economic changes were in some way 
to precipitate regionalism . Southeast Asia had also w itnessed centuries of 
political and cultural divisions which were exacerbated by the m anner in 
which the various colonial powers had linked the Southeast Asian states with 
them selves rather than each other.
The A SEA N 's predecessors lacked the m inim um  viable context 
necessary for reg ional cooperation. The sub-region was fractured by the 
existence of substantial sources of dispute among its members. In particular, 
M alaysia and The Philippines were in contention over the latter's claim to 
represent the heirs of the Sultan of Sulu and therefore constitute the rightful 
owners of the state of Sabah in north Borneo. The disputed ownership of this 
territory has rem ained a festering sore in relations betw een M alaysia and 
The Philippines for three decades and did its first damage by sabotaging the
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ASA. The effect of the Sabah issue was m agnified by the support which 
elem ents of the F ilip ino  leadership  gave to Indonesia’s 'C rush M alaysia' 
Confrontation cam paign in 1964-65.
A further problem in the dimension of context that worked against 
the earlier attem pts at regional cooperation  in Southeast A sia was the 
differing complexions of the governments in the region. Bangkok and Manila 
were firmly aligned with the W est whilst Jakarta was veering East in seeking 
closer links with the Communist capitals of Asia. Regional bodies that have 
endured, such as the EC, have  been composed of like-m inded governments. 
For exam ple, a prerequisite for mem bership of the European Community is 
the existence of parliam entary or presidential democracy.
Another poss ib l e  explanatory factor for the ASA's lack of success, 
is that of size. It could be argued that the ASA simply did not have enough 
members from within the region to cooperate effectively. Thus, for example 
when the Sabah issue became inflam ed, M alaysian - F ilipino relations were 
severely hampered and MAPHILINDO and the ASA were reduced to bilateral 
cooperation. However, the three Benelux states are an exam ple of where a 
very small group of states (Belgium , the N etherlands and Luxem bourg) can  
cooperate effectively. So size may well have contributed but on its own is not 
a sufficient reason for the failure of the ASEAN's predecessors.
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2.5 Political Will and the Failure of the ASEAN's Predecessors
The A SEA N ’s predecessors were also ham pered by a lack of 
m otivation  on the part of participants. The leaderships of the states of 
Southeast A sia had not generated su fficien t determ ination  to enable the 
necessary  steps to be taken that w ould sustain  and in tensify  regional 
cooperation. Ironically, the MAPHILINDO proposal did carry with it a vision - 
the hope of a M alay brotherhood - but the absence of a w orthw hile 
functional context meant that the idea was quickly scuttled.
W hat Southeast A sia lacked until the m id-sixties were political,
econom ic or security im peratives (either internal or external) that would act 
upon su itab ly  d isposed  leaders to genera te  com m itm ent to regional
cooperation.
2.6 Leadership and the Failure of the ASEAN's Predecessors
Leadership  m ust certain ly  not be underestim ated  in considering
Southeast Asian regional cooperation. This should firstly  be seen on a
corporate or national level. The absence of Indonesia, the largest state in the 
sub-region and the obvious leader is a second basic reason for the ASA's 
failure to germinate. It would be difficult for any Southeast Asian regional 
grouping to succeed in the absence of the state that dom inates the region 
geographically  and dem ographically. Of course, it would prove even more 
d ifficu lt to pursue regional cooperation in the face of Indonesia's overt 
opposition, as was the case with the ASA.
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The ASA's lack of success can also be related to the relatively
inexperienced  governm ents of the partic ipan ts, a num ber of which had 
recently gained independence. W ith the exception of Thailand, (a member of 
SEATO and the ASA) none of the leaderships involved in these early 
attem pts at regional cooperation had significant experience in international 
re la tions. There was no elite or bureaucratic culture to give support to 
regional cooperation. Yet this of itself cannot be held as an adequa t e  reason 
since the mem bers of the ASEAN were hardly much more experienced or 
politically 'developed' at the time of its formation.
A lack of leadership in Southeast Asian cooperation m ust also 
necessarily be seen as a deficit in i n d i v i d u a l  leadership. In understanding 
the functioning of Southeast Asian politics, it is very im portant to allow for 
the leader-centric nature of governm ent among Southeast Asian societies. 
The states which would form the ASEAN lacked a tradition of participatory 
dem ocracy  (The P h ilipp ines ' A m erican-estab lished  system  constitu tes an 
exception.) There was no popular aspiration for some type of Southeast Asia 
wide supranationalism  or even for regional cooperation. Thus, the viewpoint 
of say, Indonesia, was very much that of Soekarno, or at the most the 
viewpoint of a Southeast Asian state is that of its ruling elite.
The A SEA N 's fo rerunners lacked leadersh ip  in the national, 
e lite /bureaucra tic  and individual senses. They also were deficient in the 
supply of motivation to act for common goals. And, neither MAPHILINDO or 
the ASA possessed the m inim um  context necessary  for viable ongoing
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regional cooperation . The product of low or zero scores in all of these 
dim ensions could only be failure. The formation of the ASEAN, however, was 
a success and the rem ainder of this chapter will seek to ascertain the reasons 
for this contrasting result.
2.7 The Formation o f the ASEAN
This sub-thesis will not dwell upon the basic mechanics involved in 
the A SEA N 's form ation . Instead the approach w ill be to consider the 
conditions which gave birth to the ASEAN. Again, these shall be considered 
against the axes of context, political will and leadership.
2.8 The ASEAN's Context fo r  Cooperation
The context in which the ASEAN was form ed was in some senses 
little  d ifferen t to that of its predecessors. In 1967 functional cooperation 
among the five states that would form the ASEAN was still negligible and 
there was still an absence of popular participatory governm ents which could 
con tribu te  the broad support necessary to provide a firm  foundation for 
reg io n a lism .
W hat did exist, however, was the basic minimum context necessary
for regional cooperation. Though relations among the Five were not perfect -
issues such as N orth B orneo and S ingapore's separation from  M alaysia
illu stra te  this - the sub-region  was no longer decisively  fractured . In
p a rticu la r Indonesia  (as w ill be d iscussed  la te r)2 was now w illing to
partic ipa te . The governm ents in the five cap ita ls were also now of a
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compatible if not identical political orientation.
The ASEAN would be born in a context that no longer made a zero 
or even negative contribution to regional cooperation. It did, though, only 
make a very small positive contribution. The observer must look to the other 
dimensions of regional cooperation in order to learn why the ASEAN would 
succeed.
2.9 Political Will
The ASEAN was able to come into being due to the political and 
security im peratives that affected the states of Southeast Asia en m asse and 
indiv idually  in the m id-six ties. Such im peratives w orked pow erfu lly  to 
generate a d isposition  tow ards cooperation among the states which would 
form the ASEAN. The security factors which encouraged the birth of the 
ASEAN will be considered first.
2.10 Political Will Precipitated by Security Im peratives
The ASEAN was form ed when its m em bers had an agreed, yet 
im plicit, goal of upholding their security. In short, these security concerns 
were threefold. F irstly, the ASEAN countries were worried about the role of 
China in fom enting the expansion of Com m unism  in the Indochina states 
immediately to the North of the ASEAN. This ultim ately posed the threat of 
military invasion, principally to Thailand.
A second concern, linked to this, was the existence of Communist
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subversion w ithin the borders of the ASEAN states them selves. The danger 
that th is p resen ted  was illu stra ted  m ost g raph ically  by the a llegedly  
C om m unist-inspired attem pt to overthrow the Indonesian Governm ent in the 
abortive GESTAPU Coup on 30 September, 1965. Communist insurgency was 
also a problem  in Thailand and Malaysia, and, of course there was a tendency 
to see links between Southeast Asia's substantial overseas Chinese minorities 
and the m ainland Chinese communists.
The third area of security concern was the danger which the states 
that would form the ASEAN had posed to each other. Indonesia, with vocal 
support from  elem ents w ithin The Philippines had prosecuted a policy of 
opposing  M alaysia , w hich was deem ed to be a 'n eo -co lon ia lis t' plot. 
Indonesia's stance had even brought about armed conflict in the jungles of 
northern Borneo. Thus, the largest state w ithin the region was challenging 
the te rrito ria l in teg rity  o f one of its neighbours. O bviously , m utual 
acceptance of territorial sovereignty is fundam ental to the m aintenance of 
regional stability .
W hen considered together, the three security  concerns outlined 
above precipitated a vision for the ASEAN; not the dream of a politically 
united Southeast Asia but rather the desire to achieve a zone free of threat 
from within as well as from hostile powers without.
From  both the accom panying statem ents of m inisters and the 
Bangkok Declaration itself, security was obviously a critical consideration in 
the form ation of the ASEAN. On the one hand, there was a concern -
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particularly on the part of Indonesia and M alaysia - that the ASEAN not be 
seen as an organization  that was closely aligned with the W est. This 
em phasis was reflected in the statem ents of the M alaysian Prim e Minister, 
Tunku Abdul Rahman, to the effect that the ASEAN is not 'anti-anything',3 
the em phasis that the ASEAN was open to new m em bers4 and the fact that 
the D eclaration said explicitly that foreign bases in the region were of a 
tem porary  nature.
Later this concept, espoused especially by Indonesia, was seen in 
the way that the ASEAN states came to realize that the major threat was 
in ternal. Thus, if they all strengthened their 'national resilience' by such 
means as economic developm ent and they all worked towards the exclusion 
of Great Powers from their jurisdictions then they would be on the way to 
producing a 'resilient' region, where there would be no opportunity left for 
insurgents to stir up trouble.
Additionally, the formation of the ASEAN followed closely upon the 
reso lu tion  of the in tra-reg ional conflict evident in C onfrontation. If the 
Southern and m aritim e states of Southeast Asia were to stand against the 
advance of Com m unism  it would be necessary  to elim inate debilitating 
disputes among them selves.
T here was som e d iscussion  - inc lud ing  com m ents from  the 
Indonesian Foreign M inister - that the ASEAN could lead to more direct 
security  cooperation,^ but this was down-played. Such a mode of cooperation 
would have challenged the infant ASEAN's early direction. The ASEAN was
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not to become a new SEATO bolstered by outside powers. Indonesia and 
M alaysia emphasized that the security of the region needed to depend upon 
the countries located within it rather than upon foreign powers.
2.11 Political Will Precipitated by Political Imperatives
Apart from being an attem pt to address shared security concerns,
the birth of the ASEAN also helped to address important political needs of its
mem bers. The very act of form ing the ASEAN was a significant political
statement, even, if, as the Foreign M inister of Singapore said, the participants
at the Bangkok Declaration were not quite sure what they were saying:6
’You may recollect at the first meeting in 1967, when 
we had to draft our com m unique, it was a very 
difficult problem  of trying to say nothing in about 
ten pages, which we did. Because at that time, we 
ourselves having launched ASEAN, were not quite 
sure where it was going or w hether it was going 
anywhere at all.'
The ASEAN, above all, was formed in an atmosphere of great apprehension. 
In a sense, it was a more important that unity be shown than that much be 
said .
Related to this was the concept that regionalism  was the prevailing 
wind of the international clim ate7 and that for Southeast Asia to compete it 
was necessary that it adopt the same m odus o n e ra n d i. This was one thread 
that cam e through consisten tly  from  the ASEA N partic ipan ts ' colonial 
heritage and the H obbesian view that the in ternational environm ent was 
unsym pathetic and c ru e l.8 In contrast to the political rhetoric emphasis of
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say the Afro-Asian movement, however, this time the 'war' was to be waged 
through the means of jo int economic endeavour and cooperation.
The A SEA N’s founders did  want to outgrow the narrow nationalism 
that had, to date, divided them 9 and in this sense they were sim ilar to the 
Europeans at the close of W orld W ar II. Indeed, at the time of the ASEAN's 
foundation , d ip lom atic  links betw een M alaysia and The Philippines were 
frayed while Indonesia 's links with M alaysia and Singapore were not yet 
established. It should be stressed, how ever, that the ASEAN was not a 
political attem pt to replace narrow nationalism  with supranationalism .
Thus, collectively the states that would form the ASEAN had plenty of 
incen tive  in the p o litica l and security  d im ensions. This im petus was 
reinforced by individual concerns. These individual im peratives for regional 
cooperation functioned  in tandem  with the shared security  and political 
concerns to produce an atm osphere conducive to regionalism  among the 
leaders of the ’Five’ and helped to stimulate the political will required to take 
the im portant step forward embodied in the Bangkok Declaration. This fact 
can be dem onstra ted  by a considera tion  in turn of each m em ber's 
p e rsp e c tiv e .
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2.12 National Imperatives for Regional Cooperation
2.13 Indonesia and the Formation of the ASEAN
By early  1967, Indonesia had seen the dem ise of the Soekarno 
governm ent and the installation of the New Order adm inistration in its place. 
The new governm ent, while m aintaining Soekarno's 'independent and active' 
fo reign  policy  em phasis, was also keen to find friends. The Soeharto 
G overnm en t looked  w ith g rea te r favou r upon coopera tion  w ith  the 
A rch ipelago 's neighbours and non-C om m unist governm ents generally . An 
aversion to Chinese-linked Communism was not surprising in view of the fact 
tha t the C om m unists w ere im p lica ted  in G ESTA PU  w hich saw the
assassination of six generals.
Additionally, in the wake of K o n fro n tas i the Soeharto regime was keen 
to m end fences in the region and to pursue Indonesia's perceived rightful
role as the regional leader or 'eldest b ro ther'.10 Thus, Indonesia, which had 
clim bed down from  the W orld stage of the N on-A ligned and Afro-Asian 
m ovem ents and had brought dow n the curtain  on the excitem ent and
adventurism of Soekarno, was ripe to join an organization such as the ASEAN.
Further, the ASEAN was perceived as a new and Non-A ligned body 
which Indonesia  could jo in  from  the start and not therefore suffer the
ignom iny of being vetted by other Southeast Asian states in order to enter 
an existing regional organization.
Conversely, on the part of the other states that would form the
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ASEAN, there was a clear desire to bring Indonesia into the fold. There was a 
perception that the ASA had been unsuccessful due to the fact that Indonesia 
had not participated. Thus, reports of the time reveal a sort of 'off the record’ 
collective sigh of relief that Indonesia was to be part of the new body.11
Other evidence from the time reveals that M alaysia, The Philippines, 
S ingapore  and T hailand  w ere w illing  to go to reasonable  lengths to 
accom m odate the Indonesians. For exam ple, the statem ent in the Bangkok 
D eclaration that ’foreign bases were tem porary’ is taken as an attem pt to 
placate Indonesia, which was keen to see the removal of foreign bases from 
the reg ion .12 Also, the principle that lasting regional cooperation would have 
to be on Indonesia’s terms is reflected in the fact that the ASA had to be 
recast as the ASEAN before the Indonesians would join.
2.14. Malaysia and the Formation of the ASEAN
M alaysia, too, had good reasons to join a regional organization. The 
Federation 's partiality  to regional associations was illustrated by its earlier 
mem bership of the ASA. Indeed, M alaysia's early comm itm ent to cooperation 
was illustrated by the fact that Tunku Abdul Rahman was the first of the 
leaders of the 'Five' to articulate a theory of Southeast Asian regionalism . 
M alaysia also had the desire to establish more favourable relations with two 
of its recent opponents - nam ely, Indonesia  in K o n f r o n t a s i  and The 
Philippines in the Sabah dispute.
Involvem ent in a regional organization additionally  offered M alaysia
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the opportunity to become less attached to its form er colonial m aster, the 
United Kingdom , and in so doing would allow the Federation to assert the 
non-aligned strain in its foreign policy. This emphasis would find its regional 
analogue in M alaysian encouragement for the vision of the ASEAN as a zone 
of peace, free from outside interference.
M alaysia also had security concerns due to the effect of Communist 
in filtra tion  from  the N orth across the land border w ith T hailand. This 
in filtra tion  was associated with the pow erful CPM (Com m unist Party of 
M alaya). M alaysia’s central location in non-Com m unist Southeast Asia did, 
however, place it at the core of regional cooperation.
2.15 The Philippines and the Formation of the ASEAN
The Republic of The Philippines had strong m otivation to wish to 
becom e part of a regional organization. Like M alaysia, The Philippines had 
shown an earlier com m itm ent to regionalism  through its role in the ASA. 
Also like M alaysia, and in fact more so, The Philippines was very keen to 
iden tify  itse lf  fu rther w ith A sia. This concern  stem m ed from  The
P h ilipp ines ' c lose h isto rical links with the U nited  S tates of A m erica, 
evidenced in the continued A m erican m ilitary  presence and the strong 
im pact of American culture in the island. The Philippines was instead eager 
to associate itse lf more closely with the region and involvem ent in the 
ASEAN furthered this goal.
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2.16. Singapore and the Formation of the ASEAN
The Republic of Singapore had significant incentives to join the ASEAN. 
The island state had only just gained an unscheduled independence and so 
was keen to establish links in the region. It would, as well, be prudent to be 
on the sam e team  as S ingapore 's  m uch la rg e r ne ighbours . Further, 
m em bership offered Singapore the opportunity to emphasize its position as a 
m em ber of a predom inantly M alay region rather than as a Chinese, and 
th e re fo re  su sp e c t, is la n d  in a M alay  Sea. A ll in  a ll , the 
in ternationally -o rien ted  Singapore could not afford to rem ain outside the 
ASEAN.
2.17. Thailand and the Formation of the ASEAN
The Kingdom of Thailand, boasting a far longer period of independence 
and hence more assured in dealing with outsiders, also had early shown its 
com m itm ent to regional cooperation. This had been evident in the Thais' 
involvem ent both in the ASA and the im portant part they played in the 
establishm ent of the ASEAN. Thailand's long land borders and its traditional 
rivalry with Vietnam, coupled with the instability of the sm aller Indochinese 
buffer sta tes m ade it particu larly  vulnerab le  and therefore in need of 
s u p p o r te rs .
Thus, all of the states which would make up the ASEAN had, by 1967, 
attained an outlook that was favourable toward regional cooperation.
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2.18 Leadership and the Formation of the ASEAN
In accounting for the successful formation of the ASEAN the dimension 
of leadership  m ust also be considered. Again this can be treated at the 
national, elite and individual levels. Aspects of the first two of these three, 
have already been analyzed. It has been seen that the establishm ent of the 
ASEAN perm itted Indonesia to assum e a leading role in the region. This 
leadership  was not that of heading a supranational organization but was 
more along the lines of primus inter pares.
By contrast, Southeast Asian regionalism  did not enjoy bureaucratic 
leadership. It did not at this stage have a pro-ASEAN constituency which 
extended significantly beyond the ruling circles in the states which formed 
the Association. It was, then, essential that the ASEAN proposal enjoyed the 
support of those right at the top.
The formation of the ASEAN was certainly facilitated by the backing of 
the individual leaders of members states. For example, Thanat Khoman, who 
possessed a valuable rapport with the M alaysians, was among those who 
played a very im portant role in the birth of the grouping.13 T unku A bdul 
Rahm an and Tun Abdul Razak were able to contribute to the ASEAN's early 
conceptual d irec tio n .14 Other leaders such Lee Kuan Yew and Soeharto were 
supportive of regionalism .
The form ation of the ASEAN was also fundam entally consistent with
the prevailing nature of traditional Southeast Asian politics spelled out by
M c C lo u d .15 In the traditional (Buddhist) Southeast Asian kingdom, power
was vested in the person of the ruler and focused in the court. The ruler did
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not rule for the people. Instead the populace could merely expect a form of 
benign pro tection  and little in te rference .16 Arguably, the wider stage of the 
ASEAN could be seen to bring greater prestige to rulers such as Soeharto. It 
w ould  rem a in , how ever, g o v ern m en t-to -g o v ern m en t p res tig e  and not 
su p ra n a tio n a l.
2.19 An Assessment
How well does the birth of the ASEAN, fit with the theory explained in 
chapter one ? F irstly , it provides no evidence of the spillover effect, the 
e ssen tia l dynam ic of the n eo -fu n c tio n a lis t m odel of reg iona l grow th. 
Functional cooperation in Southeast Asia until 1967 was minimal. The ASEAN 
was not an attem pt to map politically that which was already taking place 
increm entally in the realm  of economics.
And secondly, when measured against the axes of context, political will 
and leadership the infant ASEAN's perform ance varied. It had achieved only 
the m inim um  viable context required for regional cooperation .17 It scored 
positively with regard to leadership in the national and individual senses but 
still lacked a wider elite constituency.
It was, however, political will that made the difference at this stage of 
the A SEA N  s ex is tence . Shared and ind iv idua l p o litica l and security  
im peratives gave the ASEAN leaders the m otivation required to initiate 
sub-regional cooperation successfully . The next chapter w ill consider the 
factors that have permitted the ASEAN to reach its silver jubilee.
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Chapter III: The Growth of the ASEAN
3.1 In troduction
The chief argum ent of this chapter will be that the progress of the 
ASEAN from its inception to the present time has continued to be driven by 
the determ ination, or political will, of its leaders to further regionalism  and 
tha t th is d e te rm ina tion  has been fuelled  by secu rity  and econom ic 
im peratives. These im peratives have been crucial in the developm ent of the 
ASEAN in the continuing absence of a strong supporting functional context. 
Further, it will be shown, that, the dimension of leadership, particularly in its 
national and ind iv idual form s, m ust also be considered  if one is to 
understand the first twenty-five years of the ASEAN.
3.2 Context
As the previous chapter noted, the ASEAN was founded with the 
m inim um  viab le  supporting  contex t. V ery little  functional cooperation  
existed among the members, yet the Association w a s  formed when the Five 
were at peace and when all were willing to participate.
During the tw enty-five years of the ASEAN's existence, there has 
been som e strengthening  in functional cooperation  am ong the m em ber 
states. This has included m easures to boost intra-ASEAN trade1 - which will 
be treated in the section on economic imperatives - as well as an increase in 
cultural links. W riting in 1991 Sim andjuntak observed:2
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C ulturally, a num ber of events have also come into 
being with ASEAN as initiator, helping to create a 
regional identity of the highly pluralistic societies of 
ASEAN spread over diverse aspects of life. However, 
it is difficult to gauge the loyalty of this constituency.
The context of the ASEAN is in thus a little stronger but it is doubtful as to
w hether th is  can m ake a d ec is iv e  c o n tr ib u tio n  to the co n tin u ed
strengthening of regionalism .
The ASEAN gained a secretarial structure with a wide variety of 
com m ittees designed to foster cooperation in such areas as trade, industry, 
finance, food, transport and com m unications, culture, science and technology 
and social developm ent.3 A Food Security Reserve Scheme was established. 
By 1988 thirty NGOs (Non-Governm ent Organizations) as well as a Chamber 
of Commerce and Industry were affiliated to the ASEAN Secretariat. With the 
admission of Brunei, the ASEAN's geographic extent was also enlarged.
The only m ajor im pedim ents4 caused by context were related to 
The P h ilip p in es . T hese w ere connec ted  to Sabah d ispu te  and the 
unwillingness of the other ASEAN leaders to prop up the Marcos regime in its 
dying days.5 Having said this, the ASEAN still lacked the callibre of functional 
cooperation which would act as a significant stim ulus either to m aintain 
reg iona lism  or at least to m ake a cessation  of reg ional cooperation  
unattractive. In order to see what has kept the Association functioning it is 
again necessary to consider the dimensions of political will and leadership.
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3.3 Political Will
V arious stim ulants have provided the ASEAN leaders w ith the 
m otivation to m aintain regional cooperation over the past two and half 
decades. This fact will be illustrated by considering the areas of security 
(especially Cambodia and events surrounding the M anila Summit); economics 
(responses to specific m atters such as the ICAP dispute and Japanese 
synthetic rubber as well as larger in ternational developm ents); and the 
accomodation of the Indochinese 'Boat People’.
3.4 Political Will Precipitated by Security Imperatives
For m ost of the history  of the A ssociation of Southeast Asian 
Nations, security concerns have played a vital role in m aintaining regional 
cooperation. This illustrate the way in which such concerns have helped to 
bring about a num ber of the, som etim es clum sy, attem pts at fostering 
economic and other functional cooperation on an ASEAN basis.
W ith the cases of South Vietnam and Old Order Indonesia before 
them, it was not difficult for the ASEAN states to make the connection that 
econom ic d issa tisfac tion  w ould m ake their countries m ost vulnerable to 
Communist subversion. Indeed, even the most powerful nation on the planet 
was unable to resist the popularly supported forces of Ho Chi Minh in the 
environm ent of South V ietnam ese econom ic m ism anagem ent.
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The reaction  of the ASEAN states was encapsulated in the idea
known as national resilience. This had been a tenet of Indonesian foreign 
policy since 1964/65 and was based on the idea that if a nation was strong 
in a varie ty  of d im ensions, including  po litics, social cohesiveness and 
econom ics then it would be able to stand against external foes.6 The New 
Order of Indonesian 'technocrats’ was particularly happy with this concept as 
it allow ed them  to m aintain continuity of direction while at the same time 
shifting the focus away from ideology to practical development.
The concept could be readily  translated to the ASEAN context 
through the form ulation  of 'regional resilience '. In this way all of the 
countries in the A ssociation would strive to become strong and so deny a 
foothold  to insurgents and other destabilizing fo rces.7 This thinking went 
h an d -in -h an d  w ith  the M alaysian  p roposa l fo r the n eu tra liza tio n  of 
Southeast Asia which eventually became known as ZOPFAN. Southeast Asia 
was to be a Zone of Peace Freedom and Neutrality and in the Malaysian view 
was not beholden either to East and W est and would not provide either bloc 
with a battle venue.
The role of security concerns in driving regional cooperation can be 
seen in the Bali Summit of February, 1976. Despite the fact that the ASEAN 
had been in existence for alm ost decade it had seen m inim al functional 
cooperation. The shared com m itm ent among ASEAN leaders that produced 
the Bangkok Declaration was not enough to see the organization intensify as 
an expression  of Southeast A sian regionalism . The ASEAN lacked jo int
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econom ic program m es or plans, had no m eetings of econom ic m inisters and 
did not even possess a secretariat.
It took a security-related im perative to alter this situation and to 
generate the resolve among m em ber governm ents to subscribe to the more 
intensive regionalism  that was agreed upon at Bali. This security concern was 
caused by fall of Indochina to Communism. The vigorous round of shuttle
diplom acy and the preparations for the Bali Summit evidence this concern.
The panic generated by the new situation was sufficient to bring the ASEAN 
heads of governm ent together for the first time. It also caused speculation 
that the ASEAN would develop a military dim ension.8
The actual outcom e of the m eeting was c learly  d irected  at 
preventing the expansion of V ietnam -backed Com m unism . A part from the 
obvious danger of more dom inoes toppling, there was the concern that 
V ietnam  would continue to act as a funnel for the involvem ent of external 
powers, notably China and the Soviet Union, in the region. This, and the fact 
that V ietnam  was w illing to support insurgency m ovem ents w ithin the
ASEAN states, represented a d irect challenge to two pillars o f the ASEAN 
v ision : non -in te rference  from  outside  the region  and resp ec t for the
territorial integrity of other states within the region.
Thus, a range of economic measures including the ASEAN Industrial 
Projects (AIPs) and the Preferential Tariff Arrangem ents (PTAs) that would 
enhance the regional resilience of the ASEAN states received assent. It 
should be stressed, however, that at this stage of the ASEAN's development
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the econom ic cooperation was far m ore of a 'd isplay ' than of a practical 
nature. The m easures agreed upon at Bali constituted political attem pts to 
create econom ic cooperation.
For reasons that will be discussed later in this chapter,9 the ASEAN 
leaders were not at this tim e prepared to im plem ent m easures that would 
lead to a significant freeing of trade w ithin the sub-region. The H eads of 
G overnm ent w ere attem pting to im pose an artific ia l top-heavy m ode of 
functional cooperation  ra ther than building upon a m ore natural growth 
emanating from genuine need and economic benefits.
At the same time, the ASEAN states nearest to the Cold W ar fault 
line were keen to profess that V ietnam 's perception of the ASEAN as an 
'im perialist' bloc was entirely m isplaced. As with W estern Europe the idea 
was to win the Cold W ar with non-m ilitary m eans.1®
T herefore, the security -driven  nature of the A SEA N's increased 
com m itm ent to reg ionalism  and the consequent attem pts a rtific ia lly  to 
induce functional cooperation were in evidence by 1976. This tendency was 
continued in the August, 1977 Kuala Lumpur Heads of Government M eeting 
through the establishm ent of the SW AP schem e, by which m ember states 
could be assisted  w ith short term  currency problem s. Such m onetary  
problem s co n stitu ted  an im ped im en t to sm ooth trade. O ther A SEA N 
measures in the early years that were designed to guard against unnecessary 
instability included schemes to provide em ergency supplies of fuel and rice 
to other ASEAN countries.
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3.5 Security and the Cambodian Issue
Indochina and, particularly the Cambodian issue, however, was to 
prove to be the most significant and enduring security concern of the ASEAN 
states and the one that generated  susta ined  and deepening  po litica l 
cooperation for a decade. Though it m ust be conceded that some of the 
economic measures agreed upon at the Bali and Kuala Lumpur summits could 
not realistically be expected to yield dramatic results, it must also be agreed 
that the ASEAN appeared to lose some of the m om entum  for regional 
cooperation that had apparently been accum ulated. This apparent drop in 
intensity can be paralleled with changes in perceptions of regional security.
In the years 1976-78, the security situation in Southeast Asia d id  
seem to be im proving. The dominoes were not continuing to fall and the 
V ietnam ese leadership  was giving assurances of its peaceful in ten tions.11 
These prom ises of V ietnam 's desire to live at harmony with its neighbours 
were uttered by the V ietnam ese Prim e M inister, Phan Van Dong, during 
visits to the ASEAN capitals in September and October, 1978. The invasion of 
Cam bodia by V ietnam  soon rek ind led  fears and again fuelled  greater 
cohesion among the ASEAN m em bers.12
V ietnam 's actions brought T hailand up to the front line, and 
represented an obvious challenge to the principles upon which the ASEAN 
was built. The invasion jeopardized the preservation of post-colonial borders 
and violated the territo ria l in tegrity  of another state w ithin the region. 
Further, V ietnam 's alliance with the Soviet Union continued the involvement
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of outside powers in Southeast Asia. The Sino-Soviet split which saw China at 
war with Vietnam  exacerbated this situation.
The ASEAN strategy was threefold. F irstly , it included a strident 
diplom atic offensive. This move was designed to rob the V ietnam ese-backed 
Heng Sam rin governm ent in Phnom Penh of legitim acy and so to keep the 
situation on the international political agenda. The ASEAN m em bers were 
able in itially  to delay the derecognition the Pol Pot regim e and later to 
m uster support for the recogn ition  of the m ore un iversally  palatable  
Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea. The ASEAN states were also 
vocal in calling for self-determ ination to be given to the people of Cambodia. 
Throughout the eighties, the ASEAN position won m ajority support in the 
United Nations General Assembly.
Allied to this offensive were attempts to bring the rival factions to 
the negotiating table. This part of the strategy was evident in such events as 
the International Conference on Kampuchea held in New York in July, 1981 
as well as the convening of other inform al m eetings. The use of the latter 
m ethods, for a tim e, was dubbed 'cocktail d ip lom acy '.13 Its aim was to 
initiate inform al talks in the hope that they in turn would lead to more 
structured  negotiations.
The third prong of the ASEAN strategy was that of holding out the 
'olive branch' to Vietnam. D iscussions were kept open through the ASEAN's 
unoffic ia l in te rlocu to r, Indonesia . In add ition , the A SEA N 's professed 
em phasis on econom ic developm ent and its reestablishm ent of trade links
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offered V ietnam  the opportunity of gaining valuable investm ent assistance 
with the reconstruction of her shattered economy as well as the chance to 
participate in an econom ically dynamic region. The cost of admission would 
be the settlem ent of the Cambodian issue.
The goal of the ASEAN's approach, as articulated in the 'Kuantan 
D o c t r in e ',14 was to bring Vietnam  into the Southeast Asian security zone. 
V ietnam  would then end both its alliance with the Soviet Union and the 
conflict with China. This would allow the Cambodian issue to be settled and 
also significantly lessen the involvem ent of outside powers in Southeast Asia.
From  the point of view  of ASEAN cooperation , the value of 
Cambodian issue lay in the fact that it provided an object for jo in t action as 
well as the way in which it caused the mem bers to subordinate differing 
approaches to the m aintenance of a united front. W riting in 1990, Frost 
c o m m e n te d :15
... but differences of emphasis between some ASEAN 
m em bers particu larly  Thailand and Indonesia, have 
not prevented ASEAN from m aintaining a credible 
im age of cohesion  over the issue. Indeed, the 
ex istence of d iffe ren t em phases tow ards reg ional 
security among the m embers has probably increased 
ASEAN's flexibility in pursuing possible avenues for 
discussion over Cambodia.
The ASEA N 's continued unity  on the Cam bodia issue was particularly  
significant in view of the serious potential for division.
At the two poles of the ASEAN perspective were Thailand and 
Indonesia. Thailand perceived its traditional enemy Vietnam  as the number 
one threat to regional security and therefore provided covert support to the
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the guerrilla  forces opposing the V ie tnam ese-sponsored  governm ent in 
Phnom Penh. The People's Republic of China was viewed as an ally.
Indonesia, on the other hand, was more partial to the side of 
Vietnam. This sympathy with the Vietnamese has often been traced to the 
Archipelago's high degree of empathy with Vietnam, stemming from their 
shared revolu tionary  em ergence from the colonial cocoon. In addition, 
Indonesia maintained a suspicion of Communist China and an instinctive 
dislike of 'Great Power' involvement in the region. The ASEAN was able to 
maintain a common stand on this issue of regional security rather than 
submit to the obvious temptation to divide into those supporting the Soviet 
Union backed Vietnam and those more sympathetic to China.
It would certainly be an exaggeration to say that the ASEAN 
brough t about V ie tnam 's decis ion  to w ithdraw  from  C am bodia. The 
evaporation of effective Soviet support - following rapprochem ent with 
China and then the end of the Cold W ar - combined with the disastrous 
effects of econom ic isolation were the major determ inants in forcing 
Vietnam's leaders to the to seek a solution to the Cambodian problem. It is 
true, however, that the ASEAN's strategy was successful both in preventing 
an early solution amicable to the Vietnamese and in providing a focus for 
ASEAN regionalism.16
3.6 Security and the Manila Summit
The task of ensuring regional security was also manifest in the 
attempts of the ASEAN to conduct a third Summit. The Second Summit at
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Kuala Lum pur had resolved that M anila, consistent with alphabetical order of
the m em ber states, would be the next venue for an ASEAN Heads of 
Government M eeting. At first, the M anila Summit was delayed for security 
reasons but finally  it was held because to have done otherw ise, it was 
believed  w ould , iro n ica lly , have jeo p ard ized  reg iona l s e c u r ity .17 This 
argument is sustained by a brief consideration of the events surrounding the 
December, 1987 m eeting.
In the early 1980s, B runei’s independence celebrations as well as 
the Sultanate’s accession to ASEAN membership would both have constituted 
suitable excuses for holding a heads of governm ent m eeting.18 The leaders of 
the other ASEAN states were, however, reluctant to lend legitim acy to the 
pu trefy ing  M arcos reg im e by hold ing  a h igh -leve l m eeting  in The 
P h ilip p in es ' c a p i ta l .19 M alaysia would have had even greater reluctance 
owing to M arcos' failure to make good his promise to end Filippino designs 
on the M alaysian state of Sabah.20 Helping to keep the Marcos government in 
power could have seen ASEAN leaders faced with the accusation that they 
were supporting a regime that was destabilizing the region.
Once 'people power' had installed Mrs Aquino, however, the major 
deterrent was rem oved and after an early postponem ent21 it was agreed to 
convene the Sum m it in D ecem ber, 1987. The m onths leading up to the 
meeting saw debate over whether or not it would be safe to conduct such a 
meeting in view of the danger posed to security in The Philippines both by 
Leftist rebels and Right-wing army factions.22
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T here were suggestions that the m eeting should be m oved to 
B a n g k o k .23 There was also debate over whether other ASEAN leaders should 
be asked to bring along their own security forces to bolster the protection 
that The Philippines' could provide. Indeed, after the Summit, Lee Kuan Yew 
revealed  that his security adviser had counselled him not to a ttend24 ! 
H olding the m eeting becam e im portant in order to foster the national 
resilience of The Philippines and thereby the security of the reg im e.25 In
addition, the inability to hold a Summit would have cast grave doubts upon
the viability  of the ASEAN and would therefore have made the ASEAN
appear weak in the eyes of observers in Indochina and further afie ld .26 It
would have brought into question the viability of the ASEAN vision.
The events surrounding the M anila Summit again dem onstrate the 
pa ttern : security  im peratives p rec ip ita te  the reso lu tion  am ong ASEAN
leaders to sustain regionalism . This mechanism is a vertical chain of cause 
and effect rather than a horizontal spillover process.
3.7 Political Will Precipitated by Economic Imperatives
Attem pts to deepen cooperation among the ASEAN members have 
reflected  in ternational econom ic circum stances. This relationship  has been 
dem onstrated by the practice of jo in t lobbying. Faced with the realization 
that, individually, they carry very little  economic clout, the ASEAN states 
have banded together to secure trade and other benefits from third parties. 
In effect, a political response has been used to seek econom ic concessions.
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Such a m odus operandi has been most appropriate for the level of regional 
cooperation involved in the ASEAN. It involves little  if any sacrifice by 
members and involves no transfer of power to any supranational entity
A prime case of this was when the ASEAN states joined together to 
oppose the expansion of Japanese synthetic rubber production .27 Such an 
expansion would have hurt ASEAN producers of natural rubber such as 
M alaysia, though Singapore would remain relatively unaffected. The ASEAN’s 
jo in t lobbying was successfu l in securing a Japanese pledge to lim it 
p ro d u c tio n .
Externally oriented cooperation among the ASEAN states was also 
evident in the International Civil Aviation Policy (ICAP) dispute.28 In late 
1978, A ustralia attem pted to introduce a new policy for international air 
traffic. One of the results of this policy would have been damage to the 
position of Singapore as a stopover destination on the long haul flight 
between Australia and Europe. Singapore was able to invoke the aid of the 
A SEA N  m em bers to m ake a jo in t rep resen ta tio n  to the A ustralian  
G overnm ent. This e ffo rt was able to ex tract som e altera tions to the 
A ustralian position, though it did not produce all of the changes that the 
Singaporeans had desired.
The significance of ICAP was that it constituted a case of the ASEAN 
members joining together to support the economic interests of one member, 
when four of the ASEAN countries had little to gain from such lobbying. In 
fact, it was likely that some of the other ASEAN members would actually
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have profited from the introduction of ICAP. It should be noted, too, however 
that the ASEAN position was put as a cooperative, intergovernm ental effort. 
The ASEA N does no t have the supranational m achinery to provide a 
representative who can function along the lines of say an EC delegation.
A side from  jo in t lobbying directed externally , the link between 
economic stimulants and ASEAN cooperation has been evidenced with regard 
to the international econom ic clim ate. Such a relationship was illustrated by 
the Bali Summit. This meeting came on the back of the major shake-up of the 
world economy stemming from the first 'oil shock'. Though, security concerns 
played a large part in motivating the economic measures adopted at Bali, it is 
also true that econom ic issues were instrum ental in m oving the hands of 
ASEAN leaders.
Econom ically, there was the shared perception that the ASEAN must 
increase the level of cooperation. The ASEAN had been in existence for more 
than eigh t years but had produced very little  tangib le  evidence of its
com m itm ent to reg iona lism .29 The D eclaration of ASEAN Concord which 
emanated from the Bali Summit included a decision to 'intensify cooperation 
in econom ic and social developm ent'.30 The stream lining of the ASEAN 
economic committees was another result of the Declaration.
The Bali Sum m it also agreed upon the estab lishm ent o f the 
P referential Trading A rrangem ent (PTA) schem e. U nder this, the ASEAN 
m em ber states would agree to nom inate lists of item s upon which they 
would im pose reduced tariffs if the goods originated from another country
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w ithin the A ssociation . A lthough im pressive lists of PTA item s were 
p roduced  the schem e had little  p rac tica l benefit. In tra-A S E A N  trade 
com prised only seventeen to twenty per cent of the m em bers' to tal trade 
and even this figure was boosted by Singapore’s entrepot role. Further, there 
was an unw illingness to include 'sensitive' items within the preference lists. 
For exam ple, Indonesia did not want the growth of its infant m anufacturing 
sector to be jeopardized by a flood of imports from  established plants in 
S ingapore.
A nother consequence of the Bali Sum m it was an agreem ent to 
set-up the ASEAN Industrial Projects(AIPs). These were to be showcases of 
ASEAN cooperation and were to be established in fields that would not 
damage existing industries w ithin countries of the Association. Each of the 
m embers was allocated a project: Urea Fertiliser (Indonesia and M alaysia), 
Superphosphate (The Philippines), Diesel Engines (Singapore) and Rock-Salt 
Soda Ash Project (Thailand).
The world economic clim ate had played a part in encouraging the 
ASEAN leaders to adopt some m easures for econom ic cooperation but the 
ASEAN was not yet ready to move with much haste in this field. This fact 
becam e obvious when the K uala Lum pur Sum m it in the follow ing year 
revealed very little  substantial progress resulting from  the m easures - such 
as the establishm ent of the Industrial Projects - adopted at B ali.31
A sim ilar phenom enon was evident in D ecem ber 1987 when the 
ASEAN members met in M anila.3  ^ This meeting fell not long after the stock
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m arket crash  at a tim e when even the ASEAN econom ies, w hich had
rem ained buoyant when many W estern econom ies stagnated, w ere facing 
troubled tim es. M ost im portantly , 1985 and 1986 w itnessed the ASEAN 
states having to face the increasingly pro tectionist policies of the United 
S tates.
This clim ate generated the w illingness to agree upon a range of 
econom ic m easures w hich w ere designed to boost in tra-A SE A N  trade 
including expansion of the PTAs along with a deepening of the M argin of 
Preference. There was also US$2 billion of loan guarantees forthcoming from 
visiting Japanese Prim e M inister Takeshita. Again, however, there was no 
dram atic acceleration of econom ic cooperation.
As was the case with the econom ic m easures agreed upon at the 
first and second summits, once the individual ASEAN econom ies improved 
much of the resolution needed to enhance intra-ASEAN economic cooperation 
significantly tended to evaporate .33 Commitment to the ASEAN seems to be 
open to fluctuation and is affected by the health of the m em ber's own 
econom y.
The exception to this phenomenon has been the growth of private 
sector collaboration, which, though encouraged by the ASEAN organization 
has not produced the type of political integration that the neo-functionalist 
thesis would dictate. These cooperative ventures have continued to operate 
under national law and have not required supranational regulation to iron 
out problem s in what rem ains a series of national m arkets (rather than a
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single in tegrated  one). S ignificantly , how ever, this new trend among the 
ASEAN econom ies represents a healthy movement away from the focus upon 
the artificial attem pts of governments to produce 'symbols of cooperation’ of 
questionable econom ic worth.
M ore fo rm ally , the p rocess o f ex te rn a lly  focused  po litica l 
cooperation aimed largely at economic ends has been seen in the Dialogue 
Partner process whereby, the ASEAN foreign m inisters follow  their regular 
m eetings by consultations with the representatives of A ustralia, Canada, the 
EC, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea and the USA. Economic issues have been 
one of the concerns of these dialogue meetings.
The ro le  of ex te rna l econom ic fac to rs in p rec ip ita tin g  the 
dete rm ina tion  requ ired  for in teg ra tiv e  changes was dem onstra ted  most 
recen tly  in the Singapore H eads of G overnm ent M eeting. F irstly , the 
structure of the world trading system was in question. The Uruguay Round of 
the G eneral A greem ent on T ariffs and Trade (GA TT) negotiations was 
encountering serious difficulties in reaching a conclusion. Further, there were 
signs that the world was in danger of fragmenting with the formation of two 
protectionist trading blocs focused on Europe and North Am erica. Both of 
these developm ents posed potential problems for the ASEAN due to the fact 
that they risked being shut out of markets and because of the fact that the 
Single Integrated M arket (SIM ) and North Am erican Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) would prove to be very strong lures for international investors.34 
Both of these groupings would permit access to vast ’internal’ markets.
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The m agnitude of the changes facing the ASEAN provided the
impetus to produce what, at least on paper, seems to be a significant step 
forward in (sub-)regional econom ic integration. In the first place, the Heads 
of G overnm ent agreed upon substantial and definite m easures that would 
lead to the creation of a free-trade zone. This move had been prom oted by 
the governm ent of Thai Prim e M inister Anand Panyarachun - who pointed to 
the exam ples of NAFTA and Europe's Single Internal M arket (SIM ) - and 
found ready support from Singapore.
It was Indonesia that proposed the Common Preferential Effective 
Tarriffs (CEPT) scheme which provides for tariff reduction and elim ination 
across a variety  of export categories accounting for n inety per cent of 
intra-Asean trade. There would be provision both for acceleration on the 'six 
minus x' basis and for individual states to exclude sensitive items. Indonesia, 
now more am enable to trade liberalization, caused surprise by agreeing to 
have the tariff cuts extend to the category of capital goods.35 Also, a group 
would be set-up to supervise the implementation of CEPT.
The accep tance  o f the 'six  m inus x' fo rm ula  was both a 
dem onstration of the ASEAN's real confidence (since it would now allow 
som e m em bers to break w ith the conventional consensus approach on 
econom ic issues w ithout fearing that this would d isrupt or destroy the 
A SEA N 's so lid a rity ) and an endorsem en t o f the fact tha t trila te ra l 
cooperation was now achieving signal success through the growth triangle 
c o n c e p t .36 'Six minus x’ cooperation allow s the more advanced ASEAN
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econom ies to accelerate cooperation.
A fu rther m ove tow ards greater econom ic cooperation stemming 
from  the vo latile  in ternational trading situation has been the East Asia 
Economic Caucus (EAEC) proposal championed by Malaysia. This was to be a 
support group with membership open to the states on the W estern rim of the 
Pacific Ocean. The Singapore Summit statement mentioned the EAEC but did 
not give it the imm ediate green light for reasons to be discussed in the next 
c h a p te r .37
3.8 Political Will Precipitated by the 'Boat People '
One other notable catalyst for outward-facing ASEAN cooperation, 
which does not fit readily into the category of economics or security, was the 
response of association m embers to the arrival of Indochinese refugees, the 
so-called ’boat people '.38
From  m id -1978 onwards the ASEAN states faced the problem of 
accom m odating thousands of V ietnam ese and Cambodians who were fleeing 
the conflict in their hom elands. This precipitated jo in t representations by the 
Five to the U nited N ations. A dditionally , they sought third countries for 
rese ttlem en t and tried to persuade V ietnam  to cu rta il departures. The 
ASEAN's united efforts did help to solve the refugee problem. Consistent with 
cooperation driven by more plainly security or econom ic imperatives, gains 
for members were achieved w ithout the sacrifice of national sovereignty to a 
supranational en tity .
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3.9 Leadership
The third axis for measuring regional cooperation advocated here is 
tha t o f lead ersh ip . A gain th is w ill be considered  at the national, 
e lite/bureaucratic  and individual levels.
Just as Indonesia was a vital ingredient in the form ation of the 
ASEAN, the role of the Archipelago is of great importance when it comes to 
understanding the group's progress. Indonesia has significantly  affected the 
pace of regional cooperation. To put it more strongly, the ASEAN moves no 
faster than Indonesia perm its.
This law was illustrated on a num ber of occasions in the area of 
trade cooperation. At the Bali Conference, the Indonesians were opposed to 
any early moves toward a free trade zone, fearing that such a development 
would merely act as a T ro jan  Horse' by means of which m ultinationals (as 
well as the Singaporeans) could gain unfettered access to Indonesia's internal 
m a rk e t .39 Thus, Singapore's and The Philippines' advocacy of greater free 
trade within the ASEAN could not succeed at this early stage. There was a 
perception that the good of one hundred and forty m illion Indonesians 
certainly  outw eighed that of the two m illion inhabitants of the ASEAN's 
sm allest m em ber.40
Sim ilarly, at M anila the Indonesians were still saying that economic 
cooperation should expand gradually and the outcom e of the meeting was 
consistent with th is.41 By the time of Singapore Summit, Indonesia's stance 
had changed . The A rch ipelago  now had a substan tia l export-o rien ted
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m anufacturing sector. Grow ing industria l confidence42 and presum ably the 
rea liza tion  that T N C s(T rans-N ational C orporations) w ere not alw ays a 
menace, m eant that Indonesia was ready to perm it a quickening in the pace 
of economic cooperation, and, not surprisingly the outcome of the Singapore 
Summit reflected  this perspective.
W hilst Indonesia  has continued to supply the ASEA N with a 
m easure of n a t io n a l  leadership, the organization has still seen little  of the 
b u r e a u c r a t i c  type of support enjoyed by the EC. As Frost points out43 the 
ASEAN structure has rem ained very decentralised with the Secretariat at 
Jakarta rem aining relatively weak. The decision-m aking pow er resides with 
g o v e rn m e n t re p re s e n ta tiv e s  and in te r-g o v e rn m e n ta l m e e tin g s . The 
bureaucrats who remain firm ly anchored to national governm ents have little 
if any capacity to push the organization along.
I n d i v i d u a l  leadership has, however, continued to play a very 
significant part in the ASEAN's developm ent. The two main players in this 
regard have been Prime M inister Lee Kuan Yew and, especially President 
S o e h a r to .44 By the time of the M anila Summit these two leaders were the 
only heads of member governm ents who had rem ained in office since the 
time of the ASEAN's foundation. The events surrounding the third ASEAN 
Heads of Government M eeting provide three clear exam ples illustrating the 
role of individuals in affecting the ASEAN's rate of progress.
Firstly, in the lead up to M anila, The Philippines' newly appointed 
Foreign M inister M anglapus attem pted to float the idea that the ASEAN
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should offer corporate endorsem ent to the continued presence of US bases in 
The P h ilipp ines.45 M anglapus' efforts, which found some initial support from 
the Singapore Prim e M inister,46 prompted an official, as well as a media, 
rebuke from  Indonesia.47
In the weeks prior to the Summit, Soeharto was able to meet with 
both M anglapus and Lee. Mr M anglapus emerged from his m eeting with 
President Soeharto to agree that it would indeed be inappropriate for the 
ASEAN to make a corporate expression of support for the Clark and Subic 
b a se s .48
Secondly, President Soeharto managed to shore up this position in 
the s ig n ifican t p re-sum m it con ference  at B atam  betw een with Prim e 
M inister Lee. The ASEAN veterans agreed that the US bases issue would not 
be on the agenda for the Sum m it.49 The two also reached an accord on the 
fact that the assistance cake that was to be forthcom ing from the Japanese 
would be distributed on an equitable basis and that the ASEAN's two rich, 
little members would not miss out.50 So, Soeharto was able to prevail on the 
issue of the US bases and Soeharto and Lee were able to agree in advance 
upon another m atter of contention.5 1
A third M anila related area where an individual was important is 
seen in the role that Soeharto played in making the Summit actually take 
place. It was Soeharto who took the initiative in announcing that he would 
d e f i n i t e l y  attend. This step made it very difficult for other leaders not to 
attend and therefore made sure the meeting happened.52
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Thus, the role of individual leaders must be seen as very important 
in understanding the progress of Southeast Asian regionalism. In particular, 
Soeharto 's  steadying hand has been instrum ental both in slowing and 
maintaining the pace of regional cooperation.53
3.10 An Assessment
This survey of the growth of the ASEAN over the twenty-five years 
of its existence has lent weight to the premise that the p o l i t i c a l  will  
necessary for regional cooperation has been sustained by a combination of 
external stimuli. In the main, these motivating factors have been of a 
security and an economic nature. The growth of the ASEAN cannot, however, 
be unders tood  w ithout the at tim es pow erfu l in fluence  exerted  by 
prominent, at times, dominant individuals. In a similar vein, history has 
shown that the ASEAN is by its very nature unable to move at a pace 
significantly  different to that allowed by the Indonesian colossus. The 
ASEAN's strength in the dimensions of poli t ical  will  and l e a d e r s h ip  has 
continued to enable the organization to more than compensate for its 
weakness in context  .
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46. In lhe with this Lee Kuan Yew is reported in The Jakarta Post. 12 November, 1987, 
as seeing the continuance of US bases in The Philippines as providing part of the 
context f3r the ASEAN's prosperity.
4 7 . In The Jakarta Post. 14 November, the Indonesian Foreign Minister, Mr Mochtar
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emphasized that Lee Kuan Yew did not speak for the ASEAN; an editorial two days later 
also promoted the view that Manglapus was wrong to seek the ASEAN's and, in 
particular, Indonesia's endorsement.
48. Thus The Jakarta Post. 17 & 19 November, 1987.
49. As reported in The Jakarta Post. 1 December, 1987.
50. Ib id .
51 . It is perhaps not unfair to describe Soeharto, in particular, as the 'permanent 
member' of the ASEAN Council. In a similar vein, The Jakarta Post. 28 January, 1992 
refers to '. . . Soeharto, the most senior of the six heads of governments (sic.).'
52. According to Jakarta Post. 16 December, 1987, Lee followed the example of Soeharto 
in attending the Manila Summit. Another Indonesian publication, Mer deka  quoted in 
The Jakarta Post. 19 December, 1987 makes the point that in thus standing by The 
Philippines, Soeharto was ensuring ASEAN solidarity.
53. To put it another way, Haas' modification concerning the role of key individuals has
been borne out in the case of the ASEAN. See for example, Haas E B, 'The Uniting of 
Europe and the Uniting of Latin America', Journal of Common Market Studies. Vol. V, 
No.4, June 1967, pp.325-327 re role of De Gaulle.
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Chapter IV: Conclusion: Dimensions of Regionalism
4.1 Introduction
Four tasks are involved in concluding this sub-thesis. The first will 
be to dispose of the possibility that the ASEAN has neatly conformed to a 
general theory of regionalism  (and thereby suceeded where the EC failed !). 
Secondly, by juxtaposing the ASEAN with the EC, the utility of the three 
dim ensional approach form ulated in chapter one and applied in chapters two 
and three will be dem onstrated. N ext, it w ill be shown that both the 
E uropean  and S ou theast A sian  cases im ply that successfu l reg ional 
cooperation requires a 'critical volume' (the product of the measurements in 
the three dim ensions). And, the final undertaking will be to consider where 
the ASEAN might be headed.
4.2 The ASEAN and General Theories of Regionalism
The first task of this conclusion will be briefly to verify that general 
theories of regionalism  have indeed not properly com prehended the birth 
and growth of the ASEAN. Firstly, it must be observed that the ASEAN's 
developm ent has not conform ed to M ittrany 's brand of functionalism . 
Indeed, the level of functional cooperation among m embers of the ASEAN 
has only become significant in recent years. Thus, it is im possible to cite 
'passive spillover' as a motive force in the ASEAN's growth.
N eo-functionalism  with its more active spillover m echanism  also
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draw s a b lank. T w enty-five  years ago, when Haas w rote his a rtic le1 
p rocla im ing  that the conven tional neo -func tiona lis t view  of in tensified  
regional cooperation did not provide an adequate explanation for what had 
occurred in the sixties in W estern Europe, he could not have known the 
m anner by w hich reg iona lism  w ould develop in Sou theast A sia. His 
conclusion has though, proved, to be accurate.
The ASEAN has not displayed the key dynam ic of incremental, 
functionally driven growth towards more intensive levels of cooperation. The 
A SEA N 's dealings have rem ained stric tly  based on national units and 
therefore have not required means of regulation beyond the national level. 
There has been no evidence of the spillover effect.
The ASEAN has, however, displayed some com patibility with the 
Neo-realist outlook. The state has remained the key actor and the key unit of 
decision-m aking. Yet the state-centric view is also not quite adequate. The 
ASEAN leaders have been keen to foster the cause of regional identity. The 
ICAP dispute certainly illustrates a realization that the necessity to deal in 
and support a unit larger than the nation-state  m ight well require the 
subordination of national interests.
The ASEAN is som ething more than the conventional nation-state 
but does not seek to replace that entity with som e sort of m ega-state. 
R egionalism  both in the European case and that of Southeast Asia has 
dem onstra ted  a longev ity , an a ttrac tiv en ess  and a pervasiveness that 
demands serious attention yet defies general theories.
p. 7 8
4.3 The ASEAN and Europe: Context, Political Will and Leadership 
H av ing  co n firm ed  tha t g en era l th eo rie s  canno t adequate ly  
comprehend the genesis and growth of the ASEAN, it is now time to test the 
utility of the reference dim ensions proposed in chapter one and employed in 
chapters two and three. This will be accomplished by considering each axis in 
turn. The procedure will be to recapitulate briefly on the European case and 
then to make application to the ASEAN.
Both the ASEAN and the EC 2 have been greatly affected by their 
respective contexts . European cooperation has been founded upon extensive 
functional links and a shared political and cultural heritage. W estern Europe 
is also made up of states which are internally integrated and are democratic 
in character. Further, it was shown in chapter one that the end of World War 
II left a core of W estern European states in a frame of mind - both at the 
governm ent and popular levels - that was ripe for regional cooperation. 
Thus, European regionalism  was greatly facilitated by its context.
The ASEAN has also been greatly affected by its context, yet in a 
very different way. The A ssociation's context has proved to be a constraint. 
The ASEAN started among states with minimal functional links and a history 
of division. A dditionally , the ASEAN's m em bership included countries that 
were only newly independent and still establishing their nationhood within 
their own borders. Southeast Asia did not have a heritage of regional identity 
and lacked popular support for regionalism . The ASEAN’s context has placed 
a definite lim it upon what can be realistically achieved in terms of regional
p. 7 9
coopera tion .
A second axis for m easurem ent of regional cooperation is that of 
political will . It has been shown that regionalism  is fuelled by various 
im peratives that stim ulate key decision-m akers to in itia te  or to intensify 
reg iona l coopera tion . C om m itm ent to E uropean  coopera tion  has been 
m aintained by the challenge of Com m unism  in the East, along with the 
percep tion  that tang ib le  econom ic gains can be achieved by working 
together. There is a recognition that supranational institutions have a part to 
play in advancing European integration. To some extent, the vision of a 
united Europe which it is hoped will regain for its m em bers a place of 
preem inence upon the world stage has also facilitated European regionalism.
Particular im peratives such as security and economic concerns have 
likewise served to galvanize the will to act on the part of the ASEAN leaders. 
The response, though, has been significantly  different. The ASEAN states 
have tried to achieve stability within the region by seeking the acceptance 
by all states in Southeast Asia of the principles of mutual respect for the 
post-colonial borders and for territorial integrity.
Economic concerns for most of the ASEAN’s history have given rise 
to little more than showcase cooperation (such as the AIPs and PTAs). The 
context - prim arily the lack of complem entarity among the ASEAN economies 
and Indonesia's desire to protect its infant m anufacturing sector - would not 
perm it anything else. W ithin the confines of the Southeast Asian situation, 
the im peratives that have stim ulated the best results have been those that
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required little or no sacrifice upon the part of the ASEAN members. Examples 
included the jo int lobbying over Japanese synthetic rubber, Australia's ICAP3 
and the accom m odation of boat people as well as the Cam bodian issue. 
Southeast Asian regionalism  has not generated in its members a willingness 
to hand over any aspects of sovereignty to a supranational authority. Such an 
idea is foreign to the ASEAN's experience as well as its vocabulary.
The third reference dimension of leadership will firstly be treated 
on the i n d i v i d u a l  level. De Gaulle upset the theory by acting as a brake 
upon m ore in tensified  po litica l cooperation  w hile econom ic in tegration 
continued. C hapter three of this sub-thesis illu stra ted  the ro le  of key 
statesmen, principally Soeharto and Lee Kuan Yew, in m odulating the pace of 
Southeast Asian cooperation. Thus, both the ASEAN and the EC have shown 
that they are susceptible to the influence of one or two leaders affecting 
their pace and direction.
This phenom enon leaves room  for a variety of disparate outcomes 
that students of regional cooperation are unlikely to be able to predict. 
Indeed, because the ASEAN depends so heavily upon the com m itm ent of 
national elites, in the absence of popular support, it is particularly open to 
having a leader such as Soeharto placing his stamp upon its direction. And 
obviously , leaders' w orld view s, w hich inform  their actions, can differ 
m arkedly. Consequently, the fact that individual leaders are able to have a 
significant impact upon the nature of regional cooperation in both Southeast 
Asia and the EC is more likely to be a source of divergence than similarity.
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The concept of leadership has also been considered in the n a t io n a l  
and b u re a u c r a t ic ! e l i te  senses. In the European case single states have been 
unable to exercise a long-term  dom inance of the group's direction. Europe 
has a num ber of sim ilarly-sized larger members (France, Germany and the 
United Kingdom). It also has in Brussels an elite bureaucratic culture with an 
in-built m otivation for pushing along the EC’s development.
The ASEAN by contrast has one giant m em ber, Indonesia. The 
previous two chapters have dem onstrated that Indonesia has played a most 
significant part in allow ing the group's form ation and in m odulating its 
p rog ress. The A SEA N 's bu reaucra tic  m achinery  rem ains m inim al and 
therefore contributes little as an extra source fostering regional cooperation.
The p resen t w riter subm its that the approach advocated here 
succeeds in p rovid ing  a useful tool in understanding  regionalism , and 
especially  the case of Southeast Asia. It also accounts for the frustration 
experienced by those seeking to establish a general theory of regionalism . 
The three m easures suggested for which cases of regional cooperation are 
m ost read ily  com parab le , do, pa radox ica lly , g ive rise  to the largest 
d iscrepancies. Thus, the m ost profound sim ilarities betw een the European 
Community and the ASEAN - context, political will and leadership - actually 
give rise to some of the greatest practical differences.
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4.4 The Formula fo r  Successful Regionalism ?
The above analysis can be taken a little further by considering the 
comparative  strengths  of context, political will  and leadership . Once more, 
the principle will be outlined for Europe and then it will be applied to the 
Southeast Asian situation.
Europe has great strength in context; has  had significant political, 
security  and econom ic im peratives, and c o n t i n u e s  to have economically 
generated im peratives for increased cooperation; and is strong in terms of 
bureaucratic leadership, yet is at times hampered by national and individual 
leadership. The size of the first two m uliplicands is sufficient to more than 
com pensate  for occasional fluc tua tions in the th ird  and so regional 
cooperation and integration is sustained.
The ASEAN measures up quite differently. Its singular achievement 
has been compensating for its fragile c o n te x t  through the determination o f  
its leaders.  This determination has been generated by a variety of propitious 
circum stances related to econom ic, security and other concerns. It has been 
m uch assisted by the role of key individuals and the steadying hand of 
In d o n e s ia .
T hus, su c c e ss fu l re g io n a l c o o p e ra tio n  can use d iffe re n t 
com binations of strength in the three key dimensions of context, political will 
and leadership. It requires not a sum but a c r i t i c a l  v o l u m e .  The three 
d im ensions m ust reach  a p articu la r p roduct though the sizes of the 
individual m ultiplicands may vary. A zero or negative score in a particular
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dim ension will prevent successful regional cooperation. A small score in one 
dimension will require a compensatory larger measurement in one or both of 
the other two.
Europe's volum e should be seen as sim ilar to a cube, w ith good 
m easurem ents in all three dimensions. The ASEAN's shape, however, is akin 
to a wall, the narrow dimension being context. W hether it is likely to topple, 
to be given a broader foundation or to be absorbed into something larger, is 
the concern of the next section.
4.5 The Future o f Regionalism in Southeast Asia
The final task for this sub-thesis is to make a few comments upon 
the likely future direction of regional cooperation in Southeast Asia in the 
light of the foregoing analysis.4 This can be achieved by considering the 
three foci used above: context; motivation to cooperate; and leadership.
Firstly, what influence is the ASEAN's context likely to have upon 
its future ? Economic cooperation among 'the Six' is increasing. This has been 
brought about by the increasing industrialization of the member economies. 
This has allow ed for g rea ter econom ic d iversity  am ong the m em ber 
econom ies and therefore more opportunities for intra-ASEAN trade.
Various functional organizations based on the ASEAN concept are  
being form ed. A nother sign ifican t trend is the m ovem ent tow ards more 
dem ocratic governments. This has been evident particularly in Thailand and
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The Philippines. The developm ent of dem ocratic governm ent can contribute 
to regionalism  in that it can broaden the role of the population in supporting 
both national and regional cohesiveness. Thus, the particular country is more 
able to respond to opportunities for regional cooperation w ithout at the same 
time being worried about its own national integrity and is less susceptible to 
changes of attitude to regional cooperation stem m ing from  a change in 
le a d e r.
If this gradual increase in linkages betw een the ASEAN states 
continues into the future it could provide a health ier m ilieu for regional 
cooperation. The picture is com plicated by the fact that the A ssociation's 
Southeast Asian context is likely to expand over the next decade with the 
adm ission of new m em bers. Through signing the Treaty of Am ity and 
Cooperation in Southeast Asia, Papua New Guinea, Laos and Vietnam have all 
acquired observer status within the ASEAN, the first step in seeking to join 
the organization.
Despite the fact that a context of functional cooperation certainly 
assists in the developm ent of regionalism , this sub-thesis has argued that it 
is necessary  to look further. Thus, it is necessary  to consider what 
im peratives are likely  to stim ulate  Southeast A sian leaders to look to 
regional cooperation. A gain the m ajor dim ensions to be considered are 
security and economics.
With the end of the Cold War, ASEAN decision-makers have begun 
to recast their defence policies. Indochina has been rem oved as a focus for
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unified ASEAN efforts. V ietnam  is no longer part of a hostile rival bloc 
supported by the Soviet Union. Indeed, Vietnam  has accepted the ASEAN's 
term s to enter the region . The p ictu re  has also been altered  by the 
d im in ish ing  A m erican presence  in S outheast A sia and the consequent 
possibility  that the m ajor guarantor of stability in the W estern Pacific will 
leave behind a vacuum.
The ASEAN, then, has to grapple with the possible expansion of 
Chinese, Japanese and Indian power. One response has been to elevate the 
profile of security issues in ASEAN m eetings, including those with the 
Dialogue partners. In responding to the uncertainties of the new multipolar 
situation it is probable that the ASEAN will have to look to a wider grouping, 
perhaps a structure that includes one or more of the powers on the edge of 
the region listed above.
E conom ics w ill also rem ain  a very im portan t s tim u lan t of 
cooperation among Southeast Asian Nations. There is a fear among ASEAN 
policy-makers that protectionism  could take root in both USA and the EC and 
that the W orld economy could fragm ent into trade blocs. This concern gave 
added impetus to the moves at the Singapore Summit to establish an ASEAN 
Free Trade Area.
There is, however, within the Association a perception that it will 
need to look further in responding to the new situation. As with security, the 
ASEAN on its own is just too small. One alternative is the East Asia Economic 
Caucus (EAEC) proposal. In the lead-up to the Fourth ASEAN Heads of
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Governm ent, M alaysia put considerable diplom atic effort into prom oting this
idea as evidenced by the enthusiastic and ongoing support it received in the 
pages of New Straits T im es. M alaysia .5 The United States, however, was 
opposed to the idea6 and this was echoed in a lukewarm  response in turn 
from Japan, Indonesia, and less vocally, Singapore. The latter two of course 
have very extensive trade with the USA and therefore would not wish to 
offend the Am ericans, even if the M alaysians appeared to have less qualms 
about doing so.7
The main plank in Indonesia's position was, however, that the EAEC 
should be constitu ted  under the um brella of the A sia Pacific Econom ic 
Cooperation (APEC) forum which would include the Pacific Rim 'Anglo-Saxon' 
states (but was a rb itrarily  large from  the M alaysian v iew p o in t.)8 It is 
tem pting to make the observation that the EAEC would tend to merge the 
Indonesian-led ASEAN into an organization where Japan and the People's 
Republic of China would hold key positions.9 Once again, the ASEAN was not 
perm itted to move faster than Indonesia allowed.
The economic im peratives for regional cooperation are not likely to 
go away and real questions must be asked as to w hether the ASEAN will 
prove capable of coping with the demands of the world trade environm ent of 
the tw en ty -firs t cen tury . Perhaps the 'A SEA N  w ay’ w ill d ic ta te  that 
Indonesia remains the head of a sub-bloc within a larger economic grouping.
It is difficult to forsee major changes to the ASEAN at the levels of 
national and bureaucratic leadership. In the long-term , an increase in the
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A ssociation 's  m em bership, especially  through the admission of Vietnam, 
cou ld  serve  to d ecrease  m arg ina lly  the pow er of Indones ia ;  the 
establishment of a significant supranational ASEAN civil service still seems a 
dim prospect.
Individual leaders are also likely to rem ain im portant for the 
future of Southeast Asian regionalism. The generation of leaders in power at 
the time of the ASEAN's form ation, who were supporters of regional 
cooperation, has almost entirely left the scene.10 Their replacements have 
also so far backed the ASEAN. The key baton-change, however, will come 
with the succession to President Soeharto. If, for exam ple, the next 
Indonesian President returned the A rchipelago to a policy of strident 
nationalism - unlikely though this is - then the ASEAN would be as crippled 
as were its predecessors. W hile the ASEAN remains an organization of 
leader-cen tr ic  states, it will rem ain  suscep tib le  to the unpredictable  
behaviour of individuals. In considering the future, therefore, the student 
must leave room for the unexpected and for the unpredictability  of 
ind iv idua ls .
The security and economic imperatives outlined above could well 
see the ASEAN submerged into a larger grouping such as the EAEC or APEC. 
In which case, it would be possible to say that the ASEAN 'would have 
served its purpose.'11 Such a scenario would merely be consistent with what 
nations have been doing for decades - joining together for common purposes 
and then moving on when the particular partnership has lost its pertinence.
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The progress of the ASEAN does not neatly conform  to a general 
theory of regionalism , yet the three axes of context ,  pol i t ical  wil l  and 
l e a d e r s h i p  are very useful in charting its course. A fruitful avenue for 
further research could be to see how effective the three reference axes 
em ployed here prove to be in explaining the success or failure of other 
exam ples of regional cooperation. This would enable the student to test the 
idea that successful regionalism , such as in the cases of W estern Europe and 
Southeast Asia, requires the attainm ent of a critical volume the component 
dimensions of which can vary.
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1. Haas, E B 'The Uniting of Europe and the Uniting of Latin America', Journal of 
Common Market Studies. Vol. V, No. 4, June 1967 pp.315-343
2 . Certainly, it is not difficult mount a superficially strong argument detailing the 
m anifold sim ilarities between ASEAN and the EC. Some exam ples o f superficial 
similarities between the EC and the ASEAN are as follows: both started with grand ideas 
but had to settle for a more humble and concrete beginning; both commenced with a 
core of about half a dozen; both were founded on the basis of consent rather than
com pulsion; the two groupings were initiated from within their respective regions; 
both groupings were the response of like-minded governments to a perceived common 
fear/threat; ASEAN as well as European cooperation started with the blessing of the 
USA; both had their Communist shadows in the other half of their region and the two 
cases were each born in the context of frustration with nationalism at the end of a 
period of conflict within the region.
3. For a discussion of ICAP see chapter III. It is only fair to point out that apart from
Singapore, the other 'four' had little to gain from the action directly.
4. For a discussion of the current situation and prospects of regionalism in Southeast
Asia see Buszynski, L 'Southeast Asia in the Post-Cold War Era: Regionalism and 
Security’, Asian Survey. Vol. XXXII, No. 9, September, 1992, pp. 830 -847. A number of the 
ideas that follow are based on this paper.
5. Especially on 21-25 January 1992.
6. For example New Straits Times. Malaysia. 18 January, 1992.
^ • For example, in New Straits Times. M alaysia. 6 January, 1992, the Malaysian Foreign 
M inister was on record a saying it was for Asian states, not the US to decide upon 
whether EAEC would go ahead; also, the editorial comment of 7 January, 1992 that APEC 
was the 'blue-eyed baby of the USA'. The Indonesians though were keen to refute the 
charge that they were acting to appease the Am ericans. Thus 'Indonesia Denies 
opposing EAEC out of fear of US’. Indonesian O bserver. 26 January, 1992; also 'Indonesia 
not appeasing U.S. on EAEC: Alatas, The Jakarta Post. 27 January, 1972.
8. New Straits Tim es, Malaysia, editorial of 7 January, 1992 argued against APEC on the 
grounds that it lacked a logical geographical definition and therefore was open to too
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broad a range of members.
9 .  Thus, The Jakarta Post. 27 January, 1992 (article by Dr Mari Pangestu of CSIS) notes 
that Indonesia opposes EAEC since it would dilute ASEAN and would exclude the USA. It 
was therefore seen as 'institutional' and 'confrontationalist'. S Mangkusuwondo, 
"ASEAN: Future Directions', The Indonesian Quarterly. XIX, 2, 1991 p.175 f. makes the 
point that Europe was again joining the USA and East Asia as a major destination for 
Indonesian exports. 'It should, therefore, not come as a surprise that Indonesia is not 
too keen about the possible formation of a regional economic bloc consisting of Japan, 
the Asian NIEs and ASEAN (plus possibly Australia and New Zealand). Indonesia prefers 
to link its development to all three powerhouses, the US, Japan and East Asia, and 
Western Europe , rather than depending on only one powerhouse such as for example 
Japan.'
10 . As Frank Frost, 'Introduction: ASEAN since 1967 - Origins, Evolution and Recent 
Developments." (= pp. 1-31) in Alison Broinowski (ed.) ASEAN into the 90s. Macmillan, 
London, 1990, p.20 put it : 'However, the fact that ASEAN is largely relevant to and 
maintained by, its members' elites raises the question of how ASEAN would be affected if 
the ruling elites in any of its members were to change substantially.'
11. Buszynski, L 'Southeast Asia in the Post-Cold War Era: Regionalism and Security', 
Asian Survey. Vol. XXXII, No. 9, September, 1992, p.847.
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Appendix: Substance of Regional Cooperation
The follow ing additional m aterial on the substance of regional 
cooperation has been placed in an appendix so as not to disrupt the main 
argum ent of the sub-thesis. Three categories of regional cooperation will be 
briefly  outlined:
5.1 Regional Economic Cooperation
Econom ic cooperation leading to integration can be viewed as 
taking place on a number of levels of intensity. According to Dosser et a l,1 
these are, in ascending order, the Free Trade Area (no restrictions in trade 
among m embers; national variation in dealing with outsiders); the Customs 
Union (Free Trade within; a Common External Tariff applying to outsiders); 
the Common M arket (Customs Union plus removal of internal restrictions on 
factor m ovem ents); Econom ic Union (free com m odity and factor movements 
as w ell as som e harm onization of econom ic policy); and finally , Total 
Economic Integration (the unifying of all monetary, fiscal and other policies 
as well as the hegemony of a supranational body that can make decisions 
binding on m em bers).
The same authors argue further that only the first and the last of
these forms of interaction are stable:2
In term ed ia te  form s of in teg ration  are non-v iab le.
The best historical examples of long-surviving unions 
are com pletely  in tegrated  states or federations of 
s ta te s .
The gist of the argum ent is that once the threshold of the Common Market
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stage is successfully  negotiated then an irresistib le  m om entum  w ill drive 
regional cooperation onwards to Total Econom ic Integration. On the other 
hand, since it requires so little effort to m aintain, a regional grouping can 
com fortably simmer along indefinitely as a Free Trade Area.
5.2 Regional Political Cooperation
Closely related to econom ic cooperation is political cooperation. 
Again there are different modes by which this can take place. At one end of 
the spectrum  is in tergovernm ental cooperation. In this form , sovereignty 
rem ains vested firm ly in the national governm ents. D ecisions are made by 
consensus or lim ited in their application to those states which assent. More 
in tensified  po litica l in teg ration  can take the form  of binding m ajority 
decision-making (as provisioned for in the Act of Europe).
Political integration can also be achieved through the ceding of 
elem ents of sovereignty to supranational bodies w hich are able to take 
decisions that bind all members. Political integration can be expressed finally 
in a new governm ent w ith sovereignty  over the com ponents. H istorical 
exam ples of this result include such states as Sw itzerland (a confederation) 
and the United States of America (a federation).
5.3 Regional security cooperation
S ecurity  p rov ides the th ird  s ig n ifican t ca tego ry  of reg ional 
cooperation. Once more it is im portant to distinguish between differing levels
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of in tensity . In the term inology of H aas,3 writing at a time when global 
security concerns were very much on the agenda, the two major forms are 
the p lu ra lis t ic  secu rity  com m un ity  and the am algam ated  secu rity  
comm unity. In the former case, the real power rem ains firmly in the hands 
of the national adm inistrations and the em phasis is on com plem entary 
individual efforts to prevent conflict from gaining a foothold in the region 
and to build confidence so that an enduring stability is established. Ideally, 
the participants in the region no longer view each other as a threat and so 
will abandon the use of words and actions likely to precipitate any hostility.
In the am algam ated com m unity, on the other hand, security is 
m aintained through the pooling of m ilitary forces for the prosecution of 
common goals. NATO's concerted efforts under a single high command to 
deter a possible Soviet invasion of W estern Europe provided an example of 
the operations of an am algam ated security com m unity. As Haas reported 
over three decades ago,4 it is far harder to sustain an amalgamated security 
community than a pluralistic one.
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Periodicals
Asia Week 
Asia Yearbook 1977 
The Bangkok Post 
EC News
Far Eastern Economic Review 
Indonesian Observer
The Indonesian Quarterly (especially articles in Vol. XIX, 2) 
International Organization
The Jakarta Post: the Journal of Indonesia Today
Journal of Common Market Studies
Journal of Southeast Asian Studies
The Manila Chronicle
New Straits Times. Malaysia
Singapore Bulletin
The Straits Times
The Washington Post
A Note on Asian Newspapers
The nature of s o me  of these publications posed three major problems with their use 
firstly, the bias towards their governm ents' view can tend to im pair the particular 
paper’s objectivity; secondly, Southeast Asian writers in general habitually portray the 
ASEAN as a success and are unwilling to apply their scalpel deeply; and thirdly, at least 
one of these publications (The Bangkok Post 1976/77 issues, not cited directly) saw fit to 
publish  prom inent m assage parlou r advertisem ents. Some, including  the present 
writer, find the last-mentioned objectionable. Therefore, the use of these publications 
in no sense implies blanket endorsement of their contents.
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